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ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN ARMED CONFLICT
Ashley S. Deeks*
Treaties long have recognized that a state may detain without trial 
not only opposing armed forces, but also civilians and others who pose 
threats to its security. While the procedural rules for administrative deten-
tion in international armed conflict are reasonably robust, only a very li-
mited set of treaty rules apply to administrative detention in non-
international armed conflicts. 
This article examines the treaty rules governing detention proce-
dures in international and non-international conflicts.  It then analyzes real-
world examples of administrative detention by multi-national forces and 
individual states. The article concludes that states should, as a matter of 
policy, apply several key principles drawn from treaties governing interna-
tional armed conflict to all administrative detentions. These rules impose a 
high standard for a state to initially detain a person, require the state to 
immediately review that detention, permit the detainee to appeal the deten-
tion decision, require the state to review the detention periodically, and 
obligate the state to release the detainee when the reasons for his detention 
have ceased. A state also should inform a detainee why it has detained him. 
The article argues that these core procedures, drawn from the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, are 
battle-tested and that adopting such baseline rules as matter of clearly-
stated policy would: ensure that all states strike the proper balance between 
national security and personal liberty; let states avoid answering hard 
questions about the type of armed conflicts they are fighting; and might 
facilitate multi-national operations among allies with different detainee 
policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a state is engaged in an armed conflict, one of the most im-
portant activities that the state may undertake is detention. The most famili-
ar type of detention during armed conflict is the detention by one state of its 
opponent’s armed forces: when possible, a state’s armed forces will detain 
* The author is an International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations and Visiting 
Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (on leave from the Office of the Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Department of State). The author has written this article in her personal capaci-
ty, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of 
State or the U.S. Government. 
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their opponents on the battlefield so as to prevent those fighters from con-
tinuing to take up arms. When this kind of detention occurs during armed 
conflicts between states, the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) generally pro-
vides the rules for such detentions.1
However, there are a number of other situations in which states en-
gaged in armed conflict may detain persons without necessarily bringing 
criminal charges against them.2 This article refers to this type of detention 
as “administrative detention.” First, in international armed conflict, a state 
may detain certain civilians who appear to pose a security threat to that 
state. The 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civi-
lian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) expressly con-
templates that states will undertake such detentions of civilians. Second, in 
non-international armed conflict, the state may detain individuals engaged 
in hostile acts against it, such as armed rebels and individuals that the state 
deems a serious threat to security.3 Third, individuals detained as bellige-
rents in international armed conflict—but who are not entitled to prisoner of 
war status—may face detention without criminal charge until the end of 
hostilities.4
A limited set of treaty rules prescribes the procedures a state must 
follow in determining when, how, and for how long it may administratively 
detain individuals during armed conflict. While the procedural rules for 
administrative detention contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention—
which apply to “protected persons” in international armed conflict—are 
reasonably robust, only a very limited set of treaty rules applies to adminis-
trative detention in non-international armed conflicts.5 Rather, detention in 
1  Like the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, the Third Geneva Convention does not 
provide much guidance about the procedural requirements for detaining an individual; rather, 
the treaty focuses primarily on how a state must treat individuals it detains as prisoners of 
war.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
5 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
2 This article does not take a position on whether or when a state should try to prosecute 
individuals it has administratively detained. Nor does it take a view on whether the state-
specific administrative detention rules discussed herein meet, exceed, or fall short of interna-
tional human rights obligations a state may have. 
3 Although not the primary focus of this article, there are situations short of armed con-
flict—such as states of emergency—in which states detain individuals outside of the typical 
criminal process. See infra Part IV (discussing whether common detention guidelines for 
armed conflict should apply to situations short of armed conflict). 
4 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (“Unlawful combatants are . . . subject to capture 
and detention . . . . ”). 
5 See generally Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1. The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion’s procedural rules on administrative detention technically apply only to “protected per-
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non-international armed conflict is governed almost exclusively by a state’s 
domestic law.6 Given the dearth of rules in non-international armed conflict, 
a lawyer for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has pro-
posed a set of procedural principles that states should apply to all cases of 
administrative detention, whether that detention occurs during armed con-
flict (either international or non-international) or outside of armed conflict 
entirely.7
The ICRC paper, which contains some fifteen recommended prin-
ciples and safeguards, is relatively ambitious in the rules it would have 
states apply to administrative detention, especially when that detention oc-
curs during an armed conflict. For example, the paper urges that administra-
tive detainees be provided with legal representation, and that detainees and 
their legal representatives be able to attend review proceedings in person.8
While this might be desirable, states that detain thousands of individuals at a 
time on a battlefield would find these requirements very difficult to meet. 
This article concludes that the core procedures contained in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention are battle-tested and serve as an excellent basis 
for administrative detention during all types of armed conflict. These proce-
dures impose a high standard for a state to initially detain, require the state 
to immediately review that detention, permit the detainee to appeal the ini-
tial detention decision, require the state to review the detention periodically, 
and obligate the state to release the detainee when the reasons for his deten-
tion have ceased. Coupled with a requirement to inform a detainee of the 
reasons for his detention, this collection of procedures would offer a strong 
and operationally-sustainable standard for administrative detention. Adopt-
ing such baseline rules (as matter of clearly-stated policy, if not legal obli-
gation) would ensure that all states strike the proper balance between na-
tional security and personal liberty, would let states avoid answering hard 
questions about the type of armed conflicts they are fighting, and might 
                                                     
sons,” but that category encompasses virtually all civilians in a state’s hands during interna-
tional armed conflict or occupation, either in occupied territory or the territory of a party to 
the conflict. Id. at art. 4. 
6 This means that a state’s international human rights obligations generally will attach to 
such detention. For instance, a state that is party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and is conducting administrative detentions in its territory will need to comp-
ly with that treaty’s baseline requirements for detention without charge, unless it has dero-
gated from those obligations. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4 and 
9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].  
7 Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative De-
tention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 858 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375 
(2005). While the author produced the article in her personal capacity, the ICRC has adopted 
this paper as an official ICRC paper. 
8 Id. at 388–89.  
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facilitate multi-national operations among allies with different detainee pol-
icies. 
Part II of this article describes the treaty rules that govern adminis-
trative detention during armed conflict. Part III explores real world exam-
ples of administrative detention during armed conflict both by international 
forces and by individual states, without assessing whether any particular 
practices have become customary international law.  Part IV explains why 
the core principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention are an appropriate 
source of rules for administrative detention in all types of armed conflict, 
and raises certain questions that require further exploration.
II. TREATY RULES GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
A.          International Armed Conflict 
The most robust set of treaty rules governing administrative deten-
tion is found in treaties that apply to international armed conflict. The 
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) establish rules for 
administrative detention in international armed conflict for the parties to 
those treaties.9 Various articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention establish 
the standards for administratively detaining and releasing an individual; a 
requirement for review of and appeal from the initial detention decision; and 
a mandated periodic reconsideration of the state’s decision to detain. 
Slightly different rules appear in Articles 42 and 43 of the Fourth Conven-
tion, which govern detention in the territory of a party to the conflict, and in 
Article 78, which governs detention in occupied territory. Article 75 of Ad-
ditional Protocol I adds a requirement that a state advise the detained indi-
vidual of the reasons for his detention. 
1.          Fourth Geneva Convention 
a.          Standard for detention 
The Fourth Geneva Convention establishes a high standard for de-
taining a civilian, whether in occupied territory or in the territory of a party 
9 All states are parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention.  See International Committee for 
the Red Cross, Treaty Database, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/ 
IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf. In contrast, states such as the United States, Israel, 
Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are not parties to Additional Protocol I. See Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [herei-
nafter Additional Protocol I]. 
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to the conflict. For aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, a civilian 
can be interned or placed in assigned residence “only if the security of the 
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”10 Pictet’s Commentary 
(Commentary) to Article 42 explains that states parties serve as the arbiters 
of the type of activity that constitutes a security threat, but the Commentary 
also offers several examples that would meet that standard.  The Commen-
tary states:  
It did not seem possible to define the expression “security of the State” in 
a more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to Governments to de-
cide the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external security 
of the State which justifies internment or assigned residence.  Subversive 
activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to the conflict or actions 
which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power both threaten the securi-
ty of the country; a belligerent may intern people or place them in assigned 
residence if it has serious and legitimate reason to think that they are 
members of organizations whose object is to cause disturbances, or that 
they may seriously prejudice its security by other means, such as sabotage 
or espionage . . . .11
The rule is slightly different for occupying powers in occupied terri-
tory. In that case, “if the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for im-
perative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected 
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to in-
ternment.”12 The Commentary to Article 78 explains that this article sets a 
higher standard than Article 43 for a state to detain a person: “In occupied 
territories the internment of protected persons should be even more excep-
tional than it is inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the 
former case the question of nationality does not arise.”13
Embedded in these rules is the unstated requirement that a person 
must be detained based on the particularities of his situation. For instance, a 
state may not detain a person for something his neighbor has done, or use a 
person as a bargaining chip to obtain the release of a detainee held by the 
opposing state. Nevertheless, the Commentary to Article 42 contemplates 
that someone may be detained because he is a member of a particular group, 
regardless of whether he undertakes specific hostile acts that threaten the 
security of the state. 
Both Articles 42 and 78 represent the drafters’ effort to strike the 
appropriate balance between the need for a state to intern individuals who 
10 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 42. 
11 JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY IV ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 257–58 (1958).
12 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 78. 
13 PICTET, supra note 11, at 367–68. 
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pose a threat to the state’s security and the seriousness of depriving an indi-
vidual of liberty without trial. This is, of course, the fundamental balance 
and constant tension with which states conducting administrative detention 
must grapple. 
b.          End of detention 
Article 132, which addresses when a state must terminate detention, 
acts as a mirror image of the rules in Articles 42 and 78 on initiating deten-
tion. Article 132 requires that a state release an individual detained for im-
perative reasons of security once that individual no longer poses a threat to 
security. Article 132 states: “Each interned person shall be released by the 
Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment 
no longer exist.”14 While this rule seems to contemplate immediate release 
by the detaining state when the person no longer poses a threat, a state clear-
ly requires some minimal amount of time to out-process the person. 
Of course, like the Third Geneva Convention, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention contemplates that a state will release its detainees as soon as 
possible after the close of hostilities, if the state has not already done so 
under Article 132.15
c.          Initial review of detention 
Virtually all detentions take place in the field—during routine mili-
tary patrols, for instance, or during a raid on a home or business. While in 
each case the detaining force should only detain those individuals who pose 
an imperative threat to security, the Fourth Geneva Convention implicitly 
recognizes that states will make mistakes in the field.  Thus, the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention contemplates that, after a state’s military or other forces 
detain an individual for security reasons, that individual has a near-term 
ability to challenge that detention before a court or an administrative board 
(at the choice of the state).
For aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, Article 43 pro-
vides that “[a]ny protected person who has been interned or placed in as-
signed residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon 
as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by 
the Detaining Power for that purpose.”16 The Commentary to Article 43 
allows the state to choose whether to use a court or an administrative board 
14 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 132. 
15 Compare Third Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be 
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”) with Fourth 
Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 133 (“Internment shall cease as soon as possible 
after the close of hostilities.”). 
16 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 43. 
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(consisting of more than one person), but specifies that the review must be 
independent and impartial. Specifically, the Commentary states: 
The State may act either through the courts or through administrative 
channels. The existence of these alternatives provides sufficient flexibility 
to take into account the usage in different States. The Article lays down 
that where the decision is an administrative one, it must be made not by 
one official but by an administrative board offering the necessary guaran-
tees of independence and impartiality.17
This initial review decision is not automatic, but once the detainee 
requests it, the review must be prompt. The Commentary to Article 43 
states: “Decisions to intern people or place them in assigned residence are 
not reconsidered automatically, but only at the request of the person con-
cerned. Once an application has been put forward, the court or administra-
tive board must examine it at the earliest possible moment.”18 There is some 
inherent flexibility in determining what “as soon as possible” means; for 
example, the timing might be affected by the need to set up a board in the 
first instance, or by the board’s caseload. 
Article 78, governing detention in occupied territory, provides 
slightly less detail than Article 43, but contains an internal reference to other 
provisions of the Convention. Article 78 provides: “Decisions regarding 
such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular 
procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Convention.”19 The Commentary to Article 78 
suggests that “provisions of the present Convention” include Article 43 
(even though Article 78 itself contains some duplication of rules in Article 
43, such as twice-yearly review): 
It is for the Occupying Power to decide on the procedure to be adopted; 
but it is not entirely free to do as it likes; it must observe the stipulations in 
Article 43, which contains a precise and detailed statement of the proce-
dure to be followed when a protected person who is in the territory of a 
Party to the conflict when hostilities break out, is interned or placed in as-
signed residence.20
Although they provide useful, broadly-stated rules regarding initial 
review of detention, these provisions leave unanswered a number of ques-
tions: what kinds of courts are contemplated (military? civilian?), what spe-
cific information a court or board should consider in assessing whether the 
reasons for continued detention remain, whether the detainee has the right to 
17 PICTET, supra note 11, at 260.  
18 Id.
19 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 78. 
20 PICTET, supra note 11, at 368. 
410 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:403 
appear in person at the review, and what level of confidence the court or 
board should have in order to uphold the detention. The state party must 
determine how to answer these specific questions, in a manner appropriately 
tailored to the situation it faces.
d.          Appeal of the initial determination 
Article 43 is silent on whether a detainee held in the territory of a 
party to the conflict has the right to appeal a state’s decision to detain him. 
Under Article 78, the occupying power’s initial review process must offer 
the detainee the right to appeal a decision upholding the detention. Article 
78 requires that “[t]his procedure shall include the right of appeal for the 
parties concerned.  Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay.”21
Although Article 78 is silent on which entity must perform the ap-
peal, the Commentary to Article 78 assumes that the same type of body that 
performed the initial review—a court or an administrative board—will per-
form the appeal. In the words of the Commentary, the drafters left it “to the 
Occupying Power to entrust the consideration of appeals either to a ‘court’ 
or a ‘board.’ That means that the decision will never be left to one individu-
al. It will be a joint decision, and this offers the protected persons a better 
guarantee of fair treatment.”22  This may be sensible as a practical matter—
states may find it efficient to use the same body for both the initial and ap-
pellate reviews, using different reviewers at each level—but the plain lan-
guage of Article 78 does not require it. 
e.          Periodic review 
If the first and second level reviews of an individual’s detention 
uphold the state’s initial decision to detain the person, the state must review 
the individual’s continued detention at least once every six months, whether 
or not the individual requests the review. The purpose of this requirement is, 
of course, to ensure that a state does not detain people longer than neces-
sary, whether out of administrative incompetence, laziness, or bad faith. 
Article 43 states: “If the internment or placing in assigned residence 
is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at 
least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the 
favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.”23
Article 78’s language is less specific about the entity that must review the 
decision (with no reference to a board or court) and somewhat more flexible 
on the timing of the review. Additionally, Article 78 excludes the apparent 
21 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 78. 
22 PICTET, supra note 11, at 369. 
23 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 43. 
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outcome preference (namely, release) that Article 43 contains. Article 78 
provides that “[i]n the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject 
to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set 
up by the said Power.”24 If one agrees with the Commentaries that Article 
78’s requirement that a state conduct detention “in accordance with the pro-
visions of the present Convention” includes the rules of Article 43, then 
Article 78 means that an occupying power must use an appropriate court or 
administrative board to periodically review these detentions. 
It is unclear why Article 78 builds in greater flexibility for review 
(“if possible every six months”) than Article 43, which mandates review “at 
least twice yearly.” One explanation might be that the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention’s drafters presumed that a state party generally will be in greater 
control of its own territory than it will be of occupied territory, and accor-
dingly that a state will be better able to ensure periodic reviews in a timely 
manner for detainees in its territory during the conflict.
f.           Notice to other entities 
Finally, although not strictly a rule related to administrative deten-
tion procedures, Article 43 requires the detaining state to give notice to the 
Protecting Power of those protected persons it has interned. Article 43 
states:  
Unless the protected persons concerned object, the Detaining Power shall, 
as rapidly as possible, give the Protecting Power the names of any pro-
tected persons who have been interned . . . or who have been released from 
internment . . . . The decisions of the courts or boards mentioned in the 
first paragraph of the present Article shall also, subject to the same condi-
tions, be notified as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power.25
Article 11 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contemplates that the 
ICRC may serve the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power if 
states cannot agree on such a Power.26 Additionally, Article 143 establishes 
that a detaining state must grant the ICRC access to interned protected per-
sons, which presumes that the state will notify the ICRC of the names of 
such detainees.27 These provisions serve as an additional check on the de-
taining state, because both the Protecting Power and the ICRC can monitor 
the custodial status of a detainee and can encourage the detaining state to 
comply with the periodic review provisions in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. 
24 Id. at art. 78. 
25 Id. at art. 43. 
26 Id. at art. 11. 
27 Id. at art. 143. 
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2.          Additional Protocol I 
a.          Notice of reason for detention 
Additional Protocol I adds only one significant element to the 
processes contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention—notice to the indi-
vidual detained of the reasons for his detention. Article 75(3) requires that  
“[a]ny person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed 
conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the 
reasons why these measures have been taken.”28 Beyond basic fairness, the 
primary reason to provide an individual with notice of the reasons for his 
detention is to better enable him to contest his detention if he believes that 
the state has detained him improperly. 
The reasons that the Detaining Power provides to the detainee may 
be relatively general. The Commentary to Article 75 notes: “Internees will 
therefore generally be informed of the reason for such measures in broad 
terms, such as legitimate suspicion, precaution, unpatriotic attitude, natio-
nality, origin, etc. without any specific reasons being given.”29 One reason 
that states may have wanted to keep this requirement general is that, in cer-
tain cases, issues of classification or intelligence sources may preclude a 
state from providing specific information about the individual’s situation. A 
state also has some flexibility regarding how quickly it must provide to the 
detainee the reasons for his detention. The Commentary suggests that 
“promptly” is an imprecise term, but anticipates that “ten days would seem 
the maximum period.”30
b.          End of detention 
The only other provision of Article 75 that relates to administrative 
detention discusses how detention comes to an end. Article 75(3) basically 
recites the provisions of Articles 43 and 132 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion on the release of detainees. Article 75(3) states that administrative de-
tainees (other than those arrested for penal offenses) “shall be released with 
the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances 
justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.” Of great-
er interest is the Commentary to Article 75, which recognizes that a state 
may detain an individual for extended periods of time and states: 
Legal practice in most countries recognizes preventive custody, i.e., a pe-
riod during which the police or the public prosecutor can detain a person in 
28 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, at art. 75(3).  
29 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 875 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmerman, eds., 1987). 
30 Id. at 876. 
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custody without having to charge him with a specific accusation; in peace-
time this period is no more than two or three days, but sometimes it is 
longer for particular offenses (acts of terrorism) and in time of armed con-
flict it is often prolonged.31
B.          Non-international Armed Conflict 
As the ICRC paper on procedural rules for administrative detention 
notes, the law of war rules governing the procedural aspects of administra-
tive detention in non-international armed conflict are extremely spare. 
Therefore, states conducting administrative detention in non-international 
armed conflict will be governed by their domestic laws, which generally 
include human rights provisions and due process requirements. Most states 
are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which requires each state party to “respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights rec-
ognized” in the ICCPR.32 Article 9(4) of the ICCPR provides: “Anyone who 
is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take pro-
ceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on 
the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not 
lawful.” However, “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of 
the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed,” a state may 
derogate from certain articles, including Article 9. There are no internation-
al rules or requirements for what procedures may or must replace Article 9 
during such a derogation. Therefore, neither the law of war nor human 
rights law establishes bright-line and immutable rules for detention during 
non-international armed conflicts. 
1.          Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
Article 3 of each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions—referred to 
as “Common Article 3”—appears in treaties that govern international armed 
conflict, but the Article contains baseline rules that apply to non-
international armed conflict.33 Common Article 3 contemplates that states 
(and indeed non-state actors) will detain individuals during non-
international armed conflict. While Common Article 3 provides important 
rules governing the treatment of those detained, it is silent on the procedures 
that parties to the conflict must follow regarding detention. 
31 Id. at 876–77. 
32 ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 2(1). 
33 See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. 
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2.          Additional Protocol II  
Like Common Article 3, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), clearly antic-
ipates that states parties, as well as non-state actors who meet the threshold 
application standards of Additional Protocol II, will detain individuals for 
reasons related to the conflict. Article 2 states:  
At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived 
of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to 
such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is 
restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection 
of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liber-
ty.34
The treaty provides virtually no guidance, however, on the proce-
dural rules governing administrative detention. Articles 4 through 6 address 
the treatment of those detained for reasons related to the armed conflict, but 
do not contain rules regarding the detention process. 
It is clear that, with regard to the law of war, states are bound by a 
reasonably robust set of procedural rules when they administratively detain 
protected persons during international armed conflict, but are bound by vir-
tually no such rules during non-international armed conflict. Part IV, infra,
will discuss one possible way to address this disparity.   
III. STATE PRACTICE
Beyond treaties, customary international law (CIL) offers another 
possible source of rules binding on states. For a rule to constitute CIL, two 
elements must be present: widespread and virtually uniform state practice; 
and, a belief that such practice is required as a matter of law.35 Rather than 
undertake the comprehensive effort required to assess whether any proce-
dural rules governing administrative detention have become CIL in the law 
34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
35 State practice is not found exclusively in the physical and operational actions of states, 
but also includes verbal and written acts, such as military manuals, national legislation, case 
law, and pleadings in international tribunals. See, e.g., International Court of Justice deci-
sions taking into account official statements, including the Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. 
Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 4, 195, 212 (July 25); The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slov.), 
1997 I.C.J. 41, 70 (Sept. 25).  
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of war, this section simply offers examples of state practice related to ad-
ministrative detention during armed conflict.36
This Part reviews administrative detention laws, rules, and practices 
by international or coalition operations and by individual states, without 
focusing on whether those particular administrative detention practices oc-
curred in international or non-international armed conflict. A review of the 
rules and practices suggests that the real world conduct of administrative 
detentions follows fewer rules than the ICRC paper on administrative deten-
tion argues for.37 Nevertheless, it is possible to divine certain core procedur-
al elements that virtually all of the examples include. 
A.          International or Coalition Administrative Detention Rules 
1.          KFOR 
The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployed in the wake of a 
78-day NATO air campaign that began in March 1999. The campaign was 
36 The ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law, in a proffered rule prohi-
biting arbitrary detention, cites practice in this area. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE 
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). Some of that 
practice, however, appears to reflect a predictable decision by states to incorporate their 
obligations under Article 75 of Additional Protocol I into their military manuals. In other 
cases, it is not clear that the practice the ICRC cites occurred in armed conflict. Possibly 
relevant practice in this study includes: (1) A 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the 
application of international humanitarian law between Croatia and the SFRY required that all 
civilians be treated in accordance with Additional Protocol I, Article 75. There is no indica-
tion in the study whether these two states complied with this undertaking. HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, § 2695; (2) A 1992 Memorandum of Understanding between parties to the 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, there is no indication in the study whether the 
parties complied with this undertaking. Id. § 2696; (3) Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and 
Switzerland have incorporated the language of Article 75 on “informed without delay in a 
language he understands” into their military manuals, but they may have done so simply 
because those states are parties to Additional Protocol I. See id. §§ 2697–701; (4) Spain’s 
penal code provides for punishment of anyone who, during armed conflict, fails to inform 
protected persons clearly and without delay of their situation. The use of the term “protected 
persons” suggests this rule applies only during international armed conflict. Id. § 2705; (5) 
Colombia’s “instructors’ manual” states that “persons in preventive detention shall be 
brought before a judge in the 36 hours following arrest.” Id. § 2728; (6) An Uganda National 
Resistance Army Statute provides that a person subject to military law who fails to bring a 
detainee’s case before the proper authority for investigation is subject to punishment. The 
context in which this rule would operate is not clear. Id. § 2731; (7) The Argentine, Cana-
dian, German, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and U.S. military manuals repeat the essence 
of Article 43 (and, for the United States, Article 78 during occupation). See id. § 2755–62; 
and (8) The U.S. Field Manual (1956) adds that “‘competent bodies’ to review the intern-
ment or assigned residence of protected persons may be created with advisory functions only, 
leaving the final decision to a high official of the Government.” Id. § 2762.  This calls the 
requirement of “independence” into question. 
37 Pejic, Procedural Principles, supra note 7.  
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intended to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe then unfolding in 
Kosovo. In June 1999, the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 1244, which authorized “member 
States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo . . . with all necessary means to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities.”38 Operative paragraph 9 of the Resolution, which listed 
KFOR’s responsibilities, did not specifically include detention, but included 
responsibilities that necessarily would have required detention authority, 
such as “deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary 
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return 
to Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police, and paramilitary forces” 
and “ensuring public safety and order.”39
NATO has explained its detention authority in Kosovo as follows:  
KFOR derives its legal power to detain individuals from UNSCR 1244 and 
international law, not from the Kosovo Provisional Criminal Procedure 
Code. UNSCR 1244 authorises KFOR to use all necessary means to main-
tain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, to protect itself and to sup-
port UNMIK in the maintenance of law and order.  One of these necessary 
means may be the detention of individuals who pose a threat to the safe 
and secure environment in Kosovo.  Such detentions are fully compliant 
with international law, are used sparingly and will last for only as long as 
is absolutely necessary.40
The Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) issued directives to go-
vern various activities by the forces under his command. COMKFOR De-
tention Directive 42, issued on October 9, 2001, establishes the rules for 
KFOR detentions. The document is not available publicly, so this article 
draws the following Directive provisions from quotations in Amnesty Inter-
national reports,41 a Council of Europe report,42 and a NATO press release.43
38 S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
39 Id. ¶ 9. 
40 Press Release, Kosovo Force [“KFOR”], KFOR Det. Under UNSCR, 04-28 (May 5, 
2004), available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/pr/2004/05/28.htm [hereinafter KFOR 
Press Release]. 
41 See Amnesty Int’l, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo): International Officials 
Flout International Law, A1 Index EUR 70/008/2002, Aug. 31, 2002, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/c438fdf8-a4b4-11dc-bac9-
0158df32ab50/eur700082002en.html [hereinafter Amnesty FRY Report]; Amnesty Int’l, 
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo): The Legacy of Past Human Rights Abuses, A1 Index EUR 
70/009/2004, Mar. 31, 2004, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/58cfbefa 
-a5d1-11dc-bc7d-3fb9ac69fcbb/eur700092004en.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Serbia Report]. 
42 Comm’r for Human Rights, Council of Eur., Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation and 
the Fate of Persons Displaced from Their Homes, CommDH(2002)11 (Oct. 16, 2002) (pre-
pared by Alvaro Gil-Robles), 
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/coe-kos-16oct.pdf. 
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a.          Standard for detention and notice of reasons 
Detention Directive 42 states that an individual may be detained 
under the authority of COMKFOR if he constitutes a threat to KFOR or to a 
safe and secure environment in Kosovo, if the civilian authorities in Kosovo 
are unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the matter, and if the per-
son’s detention is necessary because the threat cannot reasonably be ad-
dressed by lesser means. When those criteria are met, “COMKFOR authori-
ty to detain will only be used as a last resort.”44 Additionally, Directive 42 
provides: “[COMKFOR] will continue to use the authority to detain but 
only in cases where it is absolutely necessary. It must be noted that this au-
thority to detain is a military decision, not a judicial one.”45 The Directive 
adds: “The fact that a person may have information of intelligence value by 
itself is not a basis for detention.”46 The reference to detention as a “last 
resort” and the requirement that detention be based on security needs and be 
performed “only where it is absolutely necessary” seems consistent with the 
standards in the Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 42 and 78. Additional-
ly, detainees have the right to be informed of the reasons for their detention 
in writing, and to be notified in writing of subsequent decisions about their 
detention.47
b.          Initial review of detention 
The Directive allows KFOR on-site commanders to order detention 
for up to eighteen hours, and “allows MNB [Multi-National Brigade] com-
manders to detain people for up to 72 hours on their own authority . . . .”48
The COMKFOR must approve continued detention beyond 72 hours. 
COMKFOR can order detention for up to 30 days, subject to extension 
without an outside limit. Once COMKFOR orders someone detained, “no 
one may release that person during the ordered detention period without the 
written approval of COMKFOR.”49 These rules provide greater operational 
detail than any rules in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Of note, they require 
a high-level commander to authorize continued detention beyond 72 
hours—generally a shorter time than one might expect for individuals de-
tained during a conflict. 
                                                     
43 KFOR Press Release, supra note 40.
44 Amnesty FRY Report, supra note 41, at 12.  
45 Amnesty Serbia Report, supra note 41, at 8.   
46 Amnesty FRY Report, supra note 41, at 13.  
47 See KFOR Press Release, supra note 40.  
48 Amnesty Serbia Report, supra note 41, at 8. 
49 Id. 
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In making detention decisions, COMKFOR may consult a Deten-
tion Review Panel chaired by the KFOR legal advisor and whose members 
are designated by COMKFOR. The panel reviews requests for detention and 
makes recommendations to COMKFOR. The legal advisor makes indepen-
dent recommendations apart from the panel recommendation. It appears that 
COMKFOR may adopt or reject these recommendations.50 Detainees may 
submit petitions to COMKFOR regarding their detention, and individuals 
making detention decisions shall consider such submissions.   
c.          Additional procedures related to detention 
Although the Directive does not appear to provide for a formal ap-
peal process or  periodic review of extended detention, NATO press releas-
es state that detainees may notify family members of their detention and 
may access legal advisors at their own expense.51 Additionally, KFOR 
makes the names of detainees available to the ICRC. 
d.          Public criticism 
Several NGOs and international bodies, including Amnesty Interna-
tional, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 
Council of Europe, have criticized the KFOR detention procedures. For 
example, Amnesty objected to the fact that Directive 42 allowed 
COMKFOR to authorize detentions for long periods without judicial autho-
rization or review. Then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson wrote in 
response:
[I am] content that we are maintaining an acceptable balance between a 
Force Commander’s necessary powers to detain and the essential rights of 
those detained.  On the specific issue of the legality of detention operations 
carried out by KFOR, I have nothing to add further to my previous corres-
pondence . . . .  The relevant procedures remain in place for the exercise of 
KFOR’s powers with regard to detention, including through Directive 42, 
which places the correct emphasis upon the need for correct treatment, 
whilst ensuring that detentions are lawful and fully respectful of interna-
tional law.52   
50 See KFOR Press Release, supra note 40.  
51 Id.
52 Amnesty Int’l, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Apparent Lack of Accountability 
of International Peace-Keeping Forces in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, A1 Index EUR 
05/002/2004, at 2, Mar. 31, 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur05 
0022004; See also Amnesty Serbia Report, supra note 41, at 8 (quoting NATO Secretary 
General’s memorandum). 
2009] ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION 419
2.          INTERFET 
In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999), the Security 
Council authorized a multinational force under unified command—the In-
ternational Force for East Timor (INTERFET)—to restore peace and securi-
ty to East Timor and authorized “all necessary measures” to fulfill the 
mandate.53 INTERFET found itself forced to maintain law and order in East 
Timor, which required INTERFET to conduct detentions under a Detainee 
Ordinance issued by the Australian INTERFET Commander 
(COMINTERFET).54 INTERFET detained some individuals on suspicion of 
committing crimes and others as security risks, and created a Detention 
Management Unit to review cases.  
a.         Standard for detention, initial review of detention, and notice of 
            reasons 
The Ordinance permitted INTERFET to detain several categories of 
individuals, including those who posed a “security risk.”55 According to 
Australian Defense Force officer Michael Kelly, “security detainees were 
subject to a ‘show cause’ procedure that was regulated and managed by 
INTERFET . . . .  If a security detainee was held for more than 96 hours 
COMINTERFET or his delegate was required to certify that the risk posed 
by the detainee warranted that the detainee be held for a longer period.”56
The “show cause” procedure provided the detainee with the grounds for his 
or her detention and constituted the material that COMINTERFET consi-
dered when deciding whether to continue the detention. It is not clear what 
happened if the materials contained classified information. Before 
53 S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999).  Most believe that the 
situation in East Timor in 1999 rose to the level of an armed conflict, though INTERFET 
was not in an armed conflict with either the Government of Indonesia or militias in East 
Timor. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999), for instance, refers to con-
cerns about violations of international humanitarian law, which violations only can occur 
during armed conflict. On the other hand, the Australian Defense Forces took the view that 
no armed conflict was taking place on the territory of East Timor when INTERFET deployed 
there. See Michael J. Kelly et al., Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the Interna-
tional Force for East Timor, 841 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 101 (2001), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList182/FEC1B40BA2DF7C5FC1256B66005
F9DDF (recognizing that others, including the ICRC, believed that an armed conflict was 
taking place between INTERFET and the militias). The example of East Timor, then, argua-
bly represents administrative detention in armed conflict, though perhaps not detention by an 
opposing force. 
54 The Ordinance is not available publicly. 
55 Michael Kelly, INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor (2000), available 
at http://jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/INTERFET%20DETAINEE%20MANAGEMEN 
T%20UNIT%20(e).pdf. 
56 Id. See also Kelly et al., Legal Aspects, supra note 53. 
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COMINTERFET made a decision, “and within 144 hours of being detained, 
COMINTERFET informed the detainee in writing of the grounds on which 
the certificate was to be issued.”57
b.          Ability to contest detention 
After the detainee was notified of the grounds of the forthcoming 
certificate, INTERFET gave the detainee up to seven days, or such longer 
time as COMINTERFET considered reasonable, to show cause why a cer-
tificate should not be issued. If the detainee asked for assistance, the De-
fending Officer of the INTERFET Detainee Management Unit was availa-
ble to assist the detainee in responding to the “show cause” document. In 
some cases, the Officer succeeded in establishing that there was insufficient 
evidence against the detainee. The Ordinance did not provide for a separate 
appeal process or for judicial review. 
c.          Notice to ICRC 
INTERFET gave notice to the ICRC of any individual it detained 
for more than 96 hours. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention generally governed the administrative detention regime.58
3.          Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I)
The activities of the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) currently 
are governed by a U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) issued under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.  Under UNSCR 1546 (2004), MNF-I is 
authorized “to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance 
of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters [from then-
U.S. Secretary of State Powell and then-Prime Minister of Iraq Ayad Alla-
wi] annexed to this resolution.”59 The annexed letters describe a broad range 
of tasks that MNF-I may undertake to counter “ongoing security threats,” 
including “internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of se-
curity.”60 The letter from then-Secretary Powell states that the “forces that 
make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consis-
tently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the 
Geneva Conventions.”61 Domestic Iraqi law (in the form of Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Memorandum No. 3, which applies to MNF-I) provides 
57 Kelly, INTERFET Detainee Management, supra note 55.  
58 Kelly et al., Legal Aspects, supra note 53. 
59 S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).  
60 Id. at Annex.  
61 Id.
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detailed requirements for the conditions and procedures for security intern-
ment.62
In UNSCR 1546, the Security Council decided to review the MNF-I 
mandate within twelve months.  Subsequent UNSCRs have extended tem-
porally the authority in UNSCR 1546—most recently in UNSCR 1790, 
which extended the UNSCR 1546 mandate until December 31, 2008.63
a.        Standard for detention, initial review of detention, and notice of 
           reasons
Pursuant to UNSCR 1546, MNF-I may detain individuals for “im-
perative reasons of security.” This standard is drawn directly from Article 
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and was included to indicate that the 
same basis for detention that coalition forces applied before June 28, 2004 
would continue to apply after governing authority transferred to the sove-
reign government of Iraq. Initial review of the detention decision must oc-
cur within seven days of detention.64 A specially appointed judge advocate 
conducts such review, and decides whether to refer the individual to the 
Central Criminal Court of Iraq for prosecution, to continue to detain the 
individual, or to recommend to the Deputy Commanding General of Detai-
nee Operations that MNF-I release the individual. If MNF-I decides to con-
tinue to detain the person, MNF-I advises the detainee of the reasons for his 
detention. 
b.          Appeal of the initial determination 
Detainees may request an appeal of their detention in writing, and 
may include a written statement of their reasons for appealing. A Combined 
Review and Release Board (CRRB), a seven-officer, majority-Iraqi board, 
reviews the appeal; the detainees do not appear.65 The CRRB makes a rec-
ommendation on each appeal to the Deputy Commanding General for De-
tainee Affairs, who makes the final detention decision. 
62 Memorandum, Coalition Provisional Authority No. 3 (Revised) Criminal Procedures, 
CPA/MEM/27 § 6 (June 3, 2004), available at htpp://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (follow Mem. 
3 “Criminal Procedures (Revised)” hyperlink) [hereinafter CPA Memorandum No. 3]. 
63 S.C. Res. 1790, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007).  
64 CPA Memorandum No. 3, supra note 62, at § 6.2. 
65 Email from Army lawyer to Ashley Deeks (Aug. 30, 2007 15:01:03) (on file with au-
thor). The United Kingdom similarly uses a board comprised of U.K. and Iraqi members.  
See Memorandum from the U.K. Ministry of Def. to Select Comm. on Def. (Feb. 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/209/70
11108.htm.
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c.          Periodic review of detention and ICRC access 
Detainees in Iraq receive review of their detention every six 
months. These periodic reviews occur in the form of a Multi-National Force 
Review Committee (MNFRC), a three-officer board that assesses the threat 
posed by each detainee. The MNFRC reads the case summary to the detai-
nee at the review. The detainee may make an oral statement to the Commit-
tee, may present evidence, and may ask questions of witnesses. The Com-
mittee informs the detainee of the final decision within 45 days of the re-
view.
Under Iraqi law, MNF-I must release individuals from security in-
ternment or transfer them to the Iraqi criminal justice system no later than 
18 months from the date of detention, unless a Joint Detention Committee, 
which is staffed by ambassadorial and ministerial level U.S., UK, and Iraqi 
officials, approves further detention.66 Finally, CPA Memorandum No. 3 
guarantees the ICRC access to internees.67
B.          State Practice of Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict 
Many states have enacted administrative detention laws, but it often 
is difficult to determine whether a state’s domestic laws contemplating ad-
ministrative detention apply to (or have been used in) situations of armed 
conflict. This section focuses on four examples of security laws or proce-
dures that either were crafted specifically for armed conflict or that appear 
to have been used in situations that constituted armed conflict. 
1.          Israel 
Israel has two laws that authorize it to conduct security deten-
tions—an emergency powers law and an “incarceration of illegal comba-
tants” law. Under both laws, a detainee may have his detention reviewed by 
a court. The Government of Israel views itself as being in an ongoing armed 
conflict with Palestinian terrorist organizations operating from Judea and 
Samaria and the Gaza Strip, a view that the Israeli Supreme Court recently 
upheld in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel.68 Israel has 
used the illegal combatants law several times during armed conflict.69
66 CPA Memorandum No. 3, supra note 62, §§ 6.5–6.6.  
67 Id. at § 6.8. 
68 HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [2006] (not yet pub-
lished), available at elyon1/court/gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.  
69 Dvorak Chen, Prosecuting Terrorists: A Look at the American and Israeli Experiences,
WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL’Y, NOV. 14, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2531 (“Israel has 
used [the Unlawful Combatants] law only a few times, against high-profile terrorists from 
abroad. Most recently, Israel used it to detain Hizballah fighters during the summer war.”). 
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a.          Emergency Powers Law 
Under Israel’s emergency powers law, the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) may detain a person during a “state of emergency” when the Minis-
ter has “reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state security or public 
security require.”70 The MOD can detain individuals for up to six months.71
The detention order is subject to judicial review by the President of the Dis-
trict Court within forty-eight hours of a person’s detention and can be set 
aside if the court finds that it is not based on reasons of state security or was 
made in bad faith. The detainee may appeal his detention to the Israeli Su-
preme Court. If the court or courts uphold the initial detention, the District 
Court will review the order every three months. The proceedings are not 
public, and may depart from the regular rules of evidence.72
b.          Incarceration of Illegal Combatants Law 
i.           Standard for detention and notice of reasons 
The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) may desig-
nate and detain an individual as an “illegal combatant”—a term defined in 
the Incarceration of Illegal Combatants Law as “a person who takes part in 
hostile activity against the State of Israel, but who does not meet the condi-
tions for granting the status of prisoner of war under international humanita-
rian law, as detailed in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.”73 The 
IDF must inform the individual of the detention order, which includes the 
grounds for detention, as soon as possible.74
ii.          Initial review of detention 
The detainee may submit to the Chief of General Staff’s delegate 
arguments opposing the order.75 That officer must evaluate the detainee’s 
arguments and bring them before the Chief of General Staff, who must re-
view the arguments and, if he finds no reasonable cause to believe that the 
detainee is an illegal combatant, must quash the detention order.76 Further, if 
70 Fania Domb, Judicial Decisions, 30 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 305, 341 (2000). 
71 Administrative Detention, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative
_Detention/Israeli_Law.asp (last visited Feb. March 14, 2008).  
72 Emergency Powers and Administrative Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://hrw. 
org/reports/1997/israelwo/Israelwo-05.htm (last visited March 15, 2008).  
73 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, art. 2 (Isr.), available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf. 
74 Id. at art. 3(c). 
75 Id.
76 Id.
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the Chief, any time after he grants the order, decides that there is no longer 
reasonable cause to believe that the detainee is an illegal combatant, or there 
are special grounds to justify his release, he must quash the order.77
iii.         Periodic review of detention and access to counsel 
If the Chief of General Staff upholds the detention, the IDF must 
bring the detainee before a District Court judge within fourteen days of the 
order and once every six months thereafter.78 The court will order him re-
leased if it will not harm state security or if there are special grounds justify-
ing his release.79 The detainee can appeal decisions to the Supreme Court.80
There is no outer limit on the time for which the IDF may detain the person. 
The detainee is entitled to counsel no later than seven days before 
being brought before the District Court judge.81 The Israeli Minister of Jus-
tice may limit the pool of lawyers to those people authorized to serve as 
defense counsel in military courts.82
Regarding classified evidence, a legal brief in the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Boumediene v. Bush describes Israeli practice as follows: 
At several stages of a detention proceeding, Israel’s need to protect classi-
fied information can conflict with the detainee’s need to confront such in-
formation in order to challenge the State’s evidence effectively.  Classified 
information is protected whenever its disclosure could harm State security; 
but the decision to limit a detainee’s access to such information must be 
made by the judge.  Thus, detainees have the right to know the reason for 
their detention unless a judge finds that the information would jeopardize 
security.
Detainees have the right to be present in court for all legal proceedings un-
less a judge finds that State security requires otherwise. Where security 
concerns warrant, judges can withhold evidence from a detainee and elect 
to review it in camera and ex parte instead. . . . [I]f the court concludes 
that evidence was improperly classified, or that portions of it need not be 
withheld, the court will order the State to reveal such evidence.  In such a 
case, the State still can refuse to disclose the evidence, but only if it is will-
ing instead to free the detainee.83
77 Id. at art. 4. 
78 Id. at arts. 5(a), 5(c). 
79 Id. at art. 5(c). 
80 Id. at art. 5(d). 
81 Id. at art. 6(a). 
82 Id. at art. 6(b). 
83 Brief for Specialists in Israeli Military Law and Constitutional Law in Support of Peti-
tioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008),  
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/Boumediene_SpecialistsIsraeliMilitary
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2.          Sri Lanka 
Although neither the Sri Lankan government nor the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has officially renounced the ceasefire that 
the two parties concluded in February 2002, the ICRC’s delegate-general 
for Asia and the Pacific said in January 2006 that the situation on the 
ground was clearly a non-international armed conflict.84
Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 (PTA) specifically 
permits administrative detention. The Sri Lankan government appears to 
have suspended the use of the PTA since the 2002 ceasefire.85 However, the 
PTA remains of interest as a historical matter, and because it remains on the 
books for potential future use. 
According to the State Department’s Human Rights Report for Sri 
Lanka in 1999, a year in which the PTA remained in use, the Government 
of Sri Lanka  
detained more than 1,970 persons under the [Emergency Regulations] and 
the PTA during the year, a slightly higher number than in 1998. Many of 
these detainees were arrested during operations against the LTTE. The ma-
jority of those arrested were released after periods lasting several days to 
several months; however, the total number of prisoners held under the ER 
and the PTA was consistently close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils who 
were arrested under the PTA were being held without bail awaiting trial; 
some of these persons have been held for up to 5 years.86
a.          Standard for detention and notice of reasons 
The PTA creates very broad administrative detention rules and sets 
an easily-met standard for the state to detain individuals. The PTA states: 
Where the Minister [originally of Internal Security; now of Defense] has 
reason to believe or suspect that any person is connected with or con-
cerned in any unlawful activity, the Minister may order that such person be 
detained for a period not exceeding three months in the first instance, . . . 
and any such order may be extended from time to time for a period not ex-
                                                     
Lawamicus.pdf (citations omitted).  
84 Press Briefing, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Sri Lanka, ICRC Extremely Concerned 
About the Human Cost of Conflict (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/ 
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/sri-lanka-press-breefing-010906?opendocument. 
85 See Human Rights Watch, Return to War: Human Rights Under Siege, 71 n. 136 (2007), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/srilanka0807/srilanka0807web.pdf.  
86 Dept. of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka, Feb. 25, 
2000, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/ 
srilanka.html. 
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ceeding three months at a time: Provided, however, that the aggregate pe-
riod of such detention shall not exceed . . . eighteen months.87   
Any person detained under such an order shall be informed of the 
“unlawful activity in connection with which such order has been made.”88
b.          Initial review 
The PTA establishes an Advisory Board of not less than three 
people. The detainee (or any person acting on his behalf) may make repre-
sentations to the Board, which advises the Minister “in respect of such re-
presentations.” The Board’s recommendations do not appear to be binding 
on the Minister. Nor does the detainee have recourse to a separate tribunal; 
the PTA states that the Minister’s detention order is not subject to challenge 
in court.89
3.          India 
India’s constitution expressly contemplates administrative deten-
tion, and since 1949, India has enacted a series of security detention laws 
that supplement the constitutional rules. The current administrative deten-
tion law, the National Security Act of 1980 (NSA), applies to all of India 
except Jammu and Kashmir, and permits the government to issue detention 
orders for up to one year.90 The 1978 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 
(PSA), which applies only to Jammu and Kashmir, permits the state to de-
tain individuals without trial for a period of up to two years who act in a 
manner prejudicial to the security of the State.91 The tension between India 
and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir at times has risen to the level of an 
armed conflict, and at least one NGO recently asserted that India is grap-
pling with non-international armed conflicts in the majority of its states.92
87 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48, art. 9, § 1 (1979), availa-
ble at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/prev 
ention_of_terrorism.html. 
88 Id. at art. 13(2). 
89 Id. at art. 10. 
90 The National Security Act, art. 7(3), 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980.  
91 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 1978, § 18, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/3ae6b52014.html. 
92 See ACHR Review, Asian Center for Human Rights (2006), available at 
http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2006/124-06.htm (asserting that 19 of 28 states in India 
faced internal armed conflict). See also Human Rights Watch, The Origins of Impunity
(2006), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm (describing the situation in 
Jammu as an armed conflict). Without stating its views on the nature of the situation, the 
International Commission of Jurists noted in 1995 that “India has treated the situation of 
Jammu and Kashmir as a state of emergency but has avoided classifying it as such in interna-
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Although recent figures appear to be unavailable, the Indian Gov-
ernment reported that it held 1,163 persons under the NSA at the end of 
1997, although it is not clear what portion of this group the Government 
detained during and as a result of armed conflict.93  According to the Office 
of Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police, the Government of India 
arrested 473 persons in 2005 and 420 during 2006 under the PSA.94 The 
following discussion focuses on the NSA. 
a.          Standard for detention and notice of reasons 
Under the NSA, the Indian government may issue a detention order 
for any person “with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign pow-
ers, or the security of India” or “in any manner prejudicial to the mainten-
ance of Public order.”95 The government must inform the detainee of the 
basis for the detention order, generally within five days (and not later than 
ten days), but may withhold information that, if disclosed, would be against 
the public interest.96 It is not clear what, if anything, the state would have to 
reveal to the detainee if it believed that the disclosure of any and all infor-
mation related to the person’s detention would compromise the public inter-
est.
b.          Initial review of detention 
The executive alone can order detention for up to three months.97
The detainee may contest the order to the executive at the “earliest opportu-
nity,” but does not have the right to counsel.98 An Advisory Board, com-
prised of three judges from a federal or state High Court acting in a quasi-
judicial role, reviews the detention for “sufficient cause.” The executive 
must place each detention order before a Board within three weeks from the 
date the person is detained under the order. If the Advisory Board affirms 
                                                     
tional terms, thereby obstructing the call for accountability and transparency inherent in the 
comments of the Human Rights Committee. India has been reluctant to classify the conflict 
in Jammu and Kashmir as a non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions 
for fear of internationalising the Kashmir issue.” International Commission of Jurists’ Re-
port, Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1995), available at http://www.mofa.gov.pk 
/Pages/InternationalCommission.htm. 
93 See Dept. of State, India: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2000, Feb. 23, 
2001, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa/717.htm. 
94 Dept. of State, India: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2006, Mar. 6, 2001,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78871.htm. 
95 National Security Act, supra note 90, at art. 3. 
96 Id. at art. 8. 
97 Id. at art. 3(3). 
98 Id. at arts. 8, 11(4). 
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that sufficient cause for detention exists, the individual may be detained for 
a maximum period of one year (two years in Jammu and Kashmir).99 The 
Board must confirm or reject the detention order within seven weeks.100 If 
the Board rejects the detention, the executive must release the person 
“forthwith.” The Board does not make factual findings and is not bound by 
rules of evidence.
c.           Judicial review 
A court may intervene when the individual who ordered the deten-
tion lacked or exceeded his legal authority to do so. Indian courts will not 
look at the facts behind the detention, but can review on habeas whether the 
detention is prima facie legal. The Indian Supreme Court has held that the 
state must notify detainees of their right to contest the order and give detai-
nees the right to examine witnesses before the Advisory Board and to 
present evidence in rebuttal.101
4.          United States 
In addition to participating in the MNF-I detentions in Iraq dis-
cussed above, the United States currently is administratively detaining indi-
viduals in two other conflicts: the conflict with al Qaeda and the conflict in 
Afghanistan. The sets of procedures associated with detention in Guanta-
namo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan are each slightly different, largely because 
different parts of the U.S. government developed the procedures at different 
times, to address different situations. 
a.          Guantanamo Bay 
i.           Standard for detention and notice of reasons 
The United States may detain at Guantanamo only those who quali-
fy as “enemy combatants.” For these purposes, an “enemy combatant” is 
defined as:
an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or 
its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belli-
99 Id. at art. 13; Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, supra note 91, § 18.  
100 National Security Act, supra note 90, at art. 11(1). 
101 Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. Aligarh District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166, 2173-74 
(holding that the government must inform the detainee of his or her rights under the NSA); 
see also PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW 66-70 (Andrew Harding & John Hat-
chard eds., 1992) (noting that the Indian Supreme Court has concluded that detainees have 
the right to examine witnesses and present rebuttal evidence).
2009] ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION 429
gerent act or who has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed 
forces.102   
Additionally, the United States must notify the detainee of the op-
portunity to contest his status, to be represented by a personal representa-
tive, and to appeal the determination to a U.S. federal court.103
ii.          Initial review of detention 
By the time an individual arrives at Guantanamo, the U.S. Govern-
ment repeatedly has evaluated that individual’s status. Upon arrival, he 
receives a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), a process by which 
the United States confirms whether he is, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, an enemy combatant.104
The CSRT consists of three neutral commissioned officers of the 
U.S. Armed Forces. Each detainee may be present at the hearing (except for 
deliberation, voting, and where classified evidence is used), may receive the 
assistance of a non-lawyer personal representative, may present evidence to 
the tribunal (including relevant testimony of witnesses who are reasonably 
available and personal oral testimony), and may examine the unclassified 
evidence against him. A detainee may appeal his CSRT determination to a 
federal civilian court—the D.C. Circuit—and may hire an attorney to 
represent him there. The D.C. Circuit’s standard of review is whether the 
CSRT’s conclusion was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.105
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit in Bismullah v. Gates concluded that, in 
order to conduct a meaningful review of the CSRT determination, the court 
must have access to all of the information the CSRT obtained and consi-
dered.106 Further, the court held that the detainee’s counsel must see all of 
the classified evidence introduced against his client, except for “certain 
highly sensitive information,” which the Government must nevertheless 
show the court.107 The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s judgment in light of its decision in Boumediene v. Bush, so the D.C. 
Circuit may revisit these conclusions.108
102 A full description of the CSRT proceduresis available at http://www.defenselink.mil 
/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. 
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 
(2005).
106 Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
107 Id.
108 Gates v. Bismullah, 128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008) (vacating and remanding to D.C. Circuit in 
light of Boumediene).
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Boumediene v. Bush opened another avenue by which detainees 
may seek initial review of their detention: habeas corpus petitions.109 The 
Court concluded that the review process set up by the Detainee Treatment 
Act (DTA) was an insufficient substitute for habeas corpus review, but the 
Court’s decision did not alter the CSRT and DTA processes themselves.110
The Court’s decision therefore allows detainees to utilize both avenues si-
multaneously. At the time of this writing, legislation is pending that would 
terminate the DTA review process in the D.C. Circuit and provide habeas 
proceedings as the exclusive way in which detainees may seek judicial re-
view of the legality of their detention.111
iii.         Periodic review of detention 
A Department of Defense Directive requires that detainees under 
Department of Defense control who do not enjoy prisoner of war protec-
tions under the law of war shall have the basis for their detention reviewed 
periodically by a competent authority.112 For a detainee at Guantanamo, if a 
CSRT upholds his status as an enemy combatant and the United States does 
not intend to prosecute him in a military commission, the detainee receives 
an annual review by an Administrative Review Board (ARB), which as-
sesses whether he continues to pose a serious security threat to the United 
States.113 ARBs consider all relevant and reasonably available information 
to determine whether the detainee represents a continuing threat to the U.S. 
Government or its allies in the ongoing conflict against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, and whether there are other factors that could form the basis for 
continued detention. The ARB, which consists of a panel of three military 
officers, results in a recommendation to release, transfer, or continue to de-
tain each combatant. The Designated Civilian Officer (currently the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense) makes the final decision about the detainee’s status. 
Prior to his ARB, the U.S. Government must give the detainee no-
tice that the Board is convening, and give the detainee a written, unclassi-
fied summary sufficiently in advance to permit him to prepare his ARB 
presentation. The summary must contain primary factors favoring continued 
detention and those favoring release. The Defense Department assigns the 
109 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
110 Id. at 2275. 
111 Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act, S. 3401, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (search by bill number for S. 3401); Enemy Combatant Detention 
Review Act, H.R. 6705, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (search by 
bill number for H.R. 6705). 
112 Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Department of Defense Detainee Program, 
§ 4.8 (September 5, 2006). 
113 A full description of the ARB procedures is available at http://www.defenselink.mil 
/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf.
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detainee an Assisting Military Officer to help him review the summary and 
prepare and present information to the ARB. The detainee must be given a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard and may present evidence to the ARB in 
person.
b.          Afghanistan 
To ensure that the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom is 
detaining only those people who pose a security threat, the U.S. Govern-
ment has established a status review process in Afghanistan. 
The standard for detention is not public. The initial review takes 
place at the time of capture, to determine if the person being detained is an 
enemy combatant. The second review occurs usually within 75 days, and in 
no event more than 90 days, of the individual coming into DOD custody, 
and is based on all reasonably available and relevant information. A detai-
nee’s status determination may be subject to further review if additional 
information comes to light. The combatant commander may interview wit-
nesses and/or convene a panel of commissioned officers to make a recom-
mendation to him. The detainee will receive a periodic review of his deten-
tion, as the commander must review the detainee’s status on an annual ba-
sis.  This review, however, has tended to take place every six months.114
C.          Themes in State Practice 
The above discussion should make clear that situations often arise 
in which the Fourth Geneva Convention—the gold standard of procedural 
administrative detention rules during armed conflict—does not apply as a 
legal matter, leaving states to develop or adapt procedural rules to fit their 
specific operational situations. Although each of the examples discussed 
above offers different solutions to the difficult question of how to balance a 
state’s security with individual deprivations of liberty without trial, a few 
themes emerge. 
The requirement that internment be used as an exceptional measure 
is almost impossible to test without field study. States may establish high 
standards for detention in their laws and manuals, but it is very difficult to 
know whether, in practice, a state’s forces take great care to ensure that they 
are only detaining individuals who meet that high standard. 
Each system appears structured to ensure that detention ends when 
the reasons for the detention cease, though some systems seem more tightly 
crafted than others. The longer the time between periodic reviews, of 
course, the longer it will be before a state revisits its most recent determina-
114 Declaration of Col. James W. Gray at 5, Fadi Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669 
(D.D.C. Jul. 18, 2007).  
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tion that someone continues to warrant detention. However, very frequent 
reviews, which would avoid that problem, generally will be untenable for a 
state, which has limited personnel and resources, especially when engaged 
in heavy fighting. 
Virtually every procedural process discussed above requires the de-
tainee to be informed of the reasons for his detention. The level of detail of 
information that a detainee receives presumably varies widely in practice. 
Despite the ICRC paper’s support for a rule that requires detainees to be 
held in recognized places of internment, very few processes prescribe that 
individuals be held in such places, or even require the detention authority to 
inform a detainee’s country of nationality about his detention. However, 
several processes include notice to the ICRC, which then informs the coun-
try of nationality and the detainee’s family as a matter of practice. 
Almost all of the processes give the detainee some ability to contest 
his detention, though not all provide for an appeal, and not all give the re-
viewer the ability to mandate release. The nature of “independent” review 
varies widely: in some cases, both administrative and judicial review hap-
pens. In other cases, the senior military commander is the only person to 
review the detention.115 Periodic review periods are diverse: thirty days 
(KFOR), three months (Israel’s emergency law, Sri Lanka), six months 
(Israel’s illegal combatants law, MNF-I), one year (India, Guantanamo, 
United States in Afghanistan), and none (INTERFET). Practice seems even-
ly divided on whether the detainee may have legal or administrative assis-
tance in contesting his detention. 
One cannot generalize that international regimes necessarily pro-
vide more robust review than individual state regimes: compare INTERFET 
115 Some critics have argued that existing U.S., NATO, and coalition military boards and 
appeals to commanding officers lack independence. See Press Release, United Nations Of-
fice at Geneva, Preliminary Findings by Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-
terrorism (May 29, 2007), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en) 
/50C0462CBA023716C12572EA00489271?OpenDocument. The counter-argument is that 
administrative board composition and procedures, when coupled with the convening authori-
ty’s appellate review (in a quasi-judicial role, a role familiar to military justice practitioners), 
afford the independence contemplated by the Commentary to the Fourth Convention.  See S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing on Detainees, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Rear Ad-
miral James M. McGarrah, Director of Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy 
Combatants, June 15, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=15
42&wit_id=4358. This often is the level of review provided by the detaining state to its own 
soldiers in similar proceedings, and it avoids the burden of carrying along a separate judicial 
infrastructure.  See Press Release, Ambassador Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Detainees and the 
Rule of Law (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/opa/media/2007/
02/14/Op-Ed.pdf. Similar criticisms are leveled against the use of the “magistrate approach,” 
but military magistrates are independent of the command and are supervised by military 
judges. See Major Joseph B. Topinka, Expanding Subpoena Power in the Military, ARMY
LAW. 15, 28 (Sept. 2003).  
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(less robust) with Israel (more robust) and MNF-I (more robust) with Sri 
Lanka (less robust).  It would be useful to conduct a comprehensive study of 
state laws authorizing administrative detentions (as implemented in and out 
of armed conflict), and to examine how states have handled administrative 
detention under the Fourth Geneva Convention in the traditional, interna-
tional armed conflicts for which the treaty was drafted. 
IV. EXPANDING AND ELABORATING PROTECTIONS DURING
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
A.         Applying Fourth Geneva Convention Principles to Non-       
            International Armed Conflict 
Part II of this article considered the treaty rules that currently go-
vern the procedures by which a state conducts administrative detention. It is 
clear that, as a matter of international law, states are bound by a reasonable 
and well-balanced set of rules for administrative detention of protected per-
sons during international armed conflict, but are bound by virtually no law 
of war-based procedural rules for detentions during non-international armed 
conflict. Part III considered the practice of states, alone or in coalitions, as 
they have undertaken administrative detention in real-world situations. Sev-
eral of the examples in Part III lack one or two core elements that seem im-
portant to the fairness of the process. Sri Lanka’s law, for instance, lacks an 
appeal mechanism. India’s standard for detention is very low—any act pre-
judicial to the national security of India. KFOR’s procedures do not appear 
to provide for periodic review. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention establishes four core procedural 
elements that seem critical to any administrative detention during armed 
conflict, regardless of which entity is conducting the detention: (1) a high 
triggering standard for detention; (2) an initial review of the detention by an 
independent court or board; (3) a right to appeal; and (4) periodic reviews of 
that detention. Additionally, Article 75’s requirement to notify the detainee 
of the reasons for his detention is an important way to ensure that the detai-
nee can take advantage of his ability to contest his detention. These re-
quirements address the entire lifespan of a detention, and are readily appli-
cable in any type of armed conflict, because they were drafted to reflect the 
inherent limits of the military to perform certain acts while fighting a war. 
The requirement that a state only detain an individual for “impera-
tive reasons of security” creates a standard that is both high and sufficiently 
flexible to permit a state to detain individuals who pose different types of 
threats to it. A requirement that the state provide the detainee with the rea-
sons for his detention ensures that the state has done its homework, helps 
catch administrative mistakes, and ensures that the detainee has some mod-
icum of understanding of the basis on which to contest his detention. The 
requirement that an independent board or court review the detention further 
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ensures that the state is able to make its case on reasons for detention, in an 
atmosphere that is more conducive to careful review than the battlefield 
itself. Finally, a semi-annual review prevents a detainee from languishing in 
detention even though the external situation or the detainee’s specific cir-
cumstances may have changed. 
Although not required as a legal matter, all states should consider 
incorporating these five principles (from the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
Article 75) into any and every administrative detention process they estab-
lish or conduct during armed conflict. To make this requirement legally 
binding as an international law matter, states would need to negotiate a new 
treaty—a process that seems unlikely in the short term. But much can be 
achieved through commitments short of treaty obligations. A state might, 
for example, incorporate these five rules into its military manuals and its 
domestic law. Alternatively, it could declare that it (and its various police, 
military, and intelligence agencies) will adhere to these five rules as a mat-
ter of official government policy. 
Undertaking this step has several advantages. First, an across-the-
board determination to apply these five rules permits a state to avoid diffi-
cult questions about the type of conflict it is fighting. For instance, it is not 
clear whether the conflict in Afghanistan is an international or non-
international armed conflict; applying the five rules to any administrative 
detention would avoid this hard question, while facilitating a state’s com-
pliance with its Fourth Geneva Convention obligations if it were in fact an 
international armed conflict. Second, when a state’s detention processes are 
seen as fair, a state fighting an insurgency may have greater success with its 
counter-insurgency measures, and may avoid losing people to the insur-
gents’ side. Third, a common set of baseline rules might facilitate multi-
national detention operations by ensuring that allies start from the same 
procedural propositions. 
One important question is whether it is appropriate and advanta-
geous to elaborate the same set of rules for situations of armed conflict and 
situations other than armed conflict, as the ICRC paper urges. Several ad-
vantages flow from applying these five rules to all types of administrative 
detention. First, the lines between armed conflict and situations short of 
armed conflict often are blurred. Second, the same set of individuals may be 
conducting the detentions in and out of armed conflict (e.g., security servic-
es). One set of rules offers easier implementation and avoids the need to 
apply variable procedures to a person’s detention over time, as the situation 
shifts into or out of armed conflict. One disadvantage to uniform rules is 
that a state’s need for detention arguably is greater in armed conflict than 
during “states of emergency.” Uniform rules might inadvertently increase a 
state’s ability and willingness to conduct administrative detention outside of 
armed conflict, even though a state is generally better able to use standard 
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law enforcement tools (which may help surmount the need for particular 
security detentions) in those situations. 
On balance, it likely makes sense for a state to adopt the five rules 
described above across the range of armed conflict and situations short of 
armed conflict. The ease of applicability and the familiarity that the state’s 
officials will gain with a uniform set of procedures overcomes the marginal 
incentive to rely too heavily on administrative detention, rather than pur-
suing criminal investigations and prosecutions in non-conflict periods. Fur-
ther, a conscientious court or board could and should take into account 
whether the state was detaining during or outside armed conflict in evaluat-
ing whether the state had made an adequate case for a particular detention. 
B.  Unanswered Questions 
Even if states adopted the use of the five rules for all administrative 
detention, those rules do not provide detailed guidance on many questions 
that arise during the detention process. The examples in Part III show how a 
limited set of states have added layers of detail to some or all of the five 
rules, to greater or lesser degrees. Among the open questions are issues re-
lated to the level of detail a state must provide a person about the reasons 
for his detention, as well as the level of confidence that a board member, 
court, or appellate reviewer must have that the detainee poses a security 
threat. Related questions arise when some or all of the information that a 
state has about that security threat come from classified sources, or from 
means and methods that the state does not feel that it can disclose to the 
detainee.
A separate basket of questions relates to the detainee’s role in con-
testing or appealing his detention. A detainee should, at a minimum, be 
permitted to submit an appeal in writing and, where possible, should be 
permitted to present his case in person. It often will not be feasible for a 
state during armed conflict to produce attorneys (or even personal repre-
sentatives) to represent these detainees, especially where the state has de-
tained hundreds or thousands of individuals. In some cases, however, using 
a personal representative could actually make the detention review process 
more efficient, because the representative could assemble the detainee’s 
arguments in a more coherent fashion that he might be able to on his own. 
Even in the absence of an attorney or personal representative, per-
mitting a detainee to seriously contest his detention might mean that the 
state must help the detainee access factual information and witnesses. But 
what kind of evidence or witnesses should the detainee be able to request?  
Should the responsibility of the state to give the detainee these tools be on a 
sliding scale, as the length of detention increases? Arguably the answer to 
this last question is yes, though many states would balk at such a require-
ment.
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Finally, there are unanswered questions about outer limits on deten-
tion periods. Both the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions (and Article 
75 of Additional Protocol I) envision potentially extended periods of deten-
tion, as long as the armed conflict continues. But should there be a notional 
outer limit on detention periods, beyond which a state must take added 
measures or permit judicial review to give further oversight to the deten-
tions? Intelligence gets stale and individuals lose their connections with 
former associates or rebel groups. Should that line be located in different 
places for different types of conflict? Sri Lankan law has an outer limit of 
18 months, while Iraqi law requires MNF-I to release detainees after 18 
months unless a high-level panel reviews and authorizes extended detention. 
It would seem that the burden on a state to illustrate why it must continue to 
detain beyond 18 months or two years should be heightened in comparison 
to the more modest burden a state faces early in someone’s detention. 
V. CONCLUSION
Although detention may not be a popular concept right now, it is a 
critical incident to fighting armed conflict, and treaties long have recognized 
that a state may detain without trial not only official armed forces of its op-
ponent, but also civilians and others who pose threats to its security. Given 
the limited set of treaty rules that govern the process that states must use 
when conducting such detentions, this Article argues that states should, as a 
matter of policy, apply the Fourth Geneva Convention’s four core principles 
related to administrative detention to all such detentions during armed con-
flict, including non-international armed conflict. States also should apply 
Article 75’s principle that a detainee is entitled to know why a state has 
detained him. While these five rules do not address all operational questions 
that arise during detainee operations, they serve as a multi-legged stool on 
which to begin to balance the inherent tensions contained in the concept of 
administrative detention. 
